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COMMENT/Review of Administrative Rulings: The
Anomaly of District Court Fact-Finding
One of the functions of federal regulatory agencies is the promulgation of
rules and regulations for the administration of those matters entrusted to them
by Congress. The authority to issue such rules and regulations is ordinarily
given in the statute creating the agency.' Consistent with the basic philoso-
phy of reliance on administrative expertise, the agencies are given wide dis-
cretion in making these determinations and, while they are subject to judicial
review, 2 the courts are slow to disturb their pronouncements. 3  The agencies
are established to apply their expertise to facts and to make findings and
determinations on the basis of these facts; 4 the results of this process are to be
conclusive unless found on review to be arbitrary or beyond statutory limita-
tions.5 The procedures to be followed in rule making are prescribed by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) which, however, does not demand a
formal hearing or record of proceedings prior to the determination of issues.
Such formalities may, nevertheless, be required by other statutes.6
The decisions of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Fed-
eral Maritime Commission (FMC), Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
and the Secretary of Agriculture are subject to judicial review by provision of
1. E.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1964).
2. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
3. Speaking of rule making authority the Supreme Court has observed: "The
growing complexity of our economy induced the Congress to place regulation of
businesses like communication in specialized agencies with broad powers. Courts are
slow to interfere with their conclusions when reconcilable with statutory directions."
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956).
4. "[it is the exclusive province and function of administrative agencies to draw
legitimate inferences of fact and make findings and conclusions of fact, to appraise
conflicting testimony or other evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses and the evi-
dence adduced by the parties .... ".Noren v. Beck, 199 F. Supp. 708, 710 (S.D.
Cal. 1961).
5. "[T]he determination of questions of fact is by law imposed upon the Commis-
sion . . . . The findings of fact . . . can be disturbed by judicial decree only in cases
where their action is arbitrary or transcends the legitimate bounds of their authority."
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 254 U.S. 57, 62 (1920). Furthermore, "[e]ven
though . . . a court might reach a different conclusion, it is not authorized to sub-
stitute its own for the administrative judgment." Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United
States, 300 U.S. 297, 304 (1937). See also Florida Gulfcoast Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC,
352 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
6. See 5 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1964).
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the Judicial Review Act of 1950.7 That Act provides, inter alia, that when a
court of appeals is petitioned to review decisions of an agency and the agency
has not held a hearing before taking the action appealed from (and the agency
was not required by law to hold such a hearing), the court shall "transfer
the proceedings to a district court . . . for a hearing and determination as if
the proceedings were originally initiated in the district court . . . [if] a genu-
ine issue of material fact is presented.""
The foregoing provision is at variance with certain of the basic assumptions
delineating the personality of regulatory agencies and administrative law.
This article will focus on the effect of the judicial review provision on the
FCC,9 although the problem is potentially troublesome for the other agencies
involved. It is important to keep in mind that the problem is not one of
judicial review of rules and regulations, but judicial resolution of questions of
fact in agency proceedings. Before concentrating on the specific issues pres-
ent in the examination of the scope of review of FCC rules and orders an
outline of traditional distinctions in administrative proceedings will provide
a useful background for criticism of the Judicial Review Act's review pro-
cedure.
Administrative Determinations
Rule making is "the issuance of regulations or the making of determinations
which are addressed to indicated but unnamed and unspecified persons or
situations,"'1 whereas orders are the result of adjudicative proceedings which
by definition determine the rights of individual parties."
The APA defines "rule making" and "order" in the following terms:
(c) Rule and Rule Making.
"Rule" means the whole or any part of any agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe
the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency
and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates,
wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof,
prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (Supp. IV, 1969).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969).
9. Research and discussion with FMC and AEC personnel revealed no cases on
point. The Secretary of Agriculture was presented with the situation in one case, Ams-
hoff v. United States, 228 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 939 (1956),
but the parties stipulated to the facts to avoid the remand problem.
10. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARv. L. REV. 259, 265
(1938).
11. Adjudication is defined as "the application of a statute or other legal standard
to a given fact situation involving particular individuals." Air Line Pilots Ass'n v.
Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 896 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961).
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valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing upon any of
the foregoing. "Rule making" means agency process for the formu-
lation, amendment, or repeal of a rule. 12
(d) Order and Adjudication.
"Order" means the whole or any part of the final disposition
(whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form)
of any agency in any matter other than rule making but including
licensing. "Adjudication" means agency process for the formula-
tion of an order.' 3
Questions of fact arising in an administrative context may be categorized
as either adjudicative or legislative. Adjudicative facts relate to the parties
and their activities, usually answering the questions of who did what, where,
when, how and with what motive or intent.' 4  Such facts usually arise in
the formulation of an order. Legislative facts are those which usually do
not concern any immediate parties but are general facts which help the tri-
bunal decide questions of law, policy and discretion in the context of rule
making.' 5
Fact Questions-Requirement of a Hearing
When adjudicative facts are in issue a hearing is required. The principal
reason for requiring a hearing when administrative determinations affect in-
dividuals directly is the due process requirement of the fifth amendment."
"Due process" is an elusive concept. . . . [W]hen governmental
agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly
affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those
agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been associ-
ated with the judicial process. On the other hand, when gov-
ernmental action does not partake of an adjudication . . . it is
not necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used. 17
The procedures traditionally associated with the judicial process are those
of a trial with opportunity to present witnesses and cross-examine opposing
parties. Such procedure is not necessary when individual rights are not being
determined. This concept was expressed in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v.
Board of Equalization's which held that: "Where a rule of conduct ap-
plies to more than a few people it is impracticable that every one should
12. 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1964).
13. Id. § 1001(d).
14. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.02, at 413 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIS].
15. id.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be . . .deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ......
17. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
18. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
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have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not require all
public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole."' 9
That is, where acts of government affect a general populace, it is neither
necessary nor practical to give each person a hearing.
An adjudicative question of fact could arise in a rule making which was
so narrow as to act upon one or several particular parties. This is rare, but
it has happened, and where the rule does have this characteristic of an order,
the law has long been that a hearing is required. In Londoner v. Den-
ver,20 concerning a tax imposed on several landowners for paving a street,
a trial-type hearing was held to be necessary. In the similar Bi-Metallic
case,21 concerning a general increase in valuation of taxable property, no
hearing was required. The distinguishing principle between these two cases
is "that a party . . . has a right to be heard when official action is based
upon 'individual grounds' but not necessarily when official action is based
upon general grounds, that is, when the facts are adjudicative but not when
they are legislative."'22 In a more recent case 23 the FAA ruled that persons
over the age of sixty could not be pilots. In denying a hearing on the matter
the Second Circuit said: "Congress intended that the section [granting
hearings for review of agency actions on licenses] should apply only when
an order of the Administrator is directed to an individual airman and is
concerned with conduct or other facts peculiar to that airman."
24
The circumstances requiring a hearing based on due process should not be
confused with those entitling a party to challenge a rule's validity be-
fore it is applied to him. For example, in 1941 the FCC promulgated
their Chain Broadcasting Rules25 which affected contractual relations between
chain broadcasters and their affiliates. The Supreme Court held that those
rules could be challenged as orders before being specifically applied to an
individual since they "have the force of law before their sanctions are in-
voked as well as after. When, as here, they are promulgated by order of
the Commission and the expected conformity to them causes injury cognizable
by a court of equity, they are appropriately the subject of attack .... "11
Although noting that the regulations were not directed toward the appellant,
the Court found that the appellant had sufficient standing to maintain the
19. Id. at 445.
20. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
21. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
22. 1 DAvis § 7.04, at 421.
23. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 962 (1961).
24. 276 F.2d at 897.
25. 47 C.F.R. §§ 3.101 to .108 (1969).
26. CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418-19 (1942).
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suit since "[i]t is enough that, by setting the controlling standards for the
Commission's action, the regulations purport to operate to alter and affect
adversely appellant's contractual rights and business relations .... "27 In
such cases the rules are challenged as arbitrary, capricious or beyond statutory
authority. To obtain a hearing on the rule as it affects him, a party must
file a request for a waiver which states a valid claim or wait until the rule
is applied against him directly. 28
In summary, a hearing is required when an adjudicative fact determination
is being made; a hearing is not required when a legislative fact determination
is being made (i.e., a rule making) except in those rare cases where the oper-
ation of the rule is equivalent to an order to specified parties.
Review Under the Judicial Review Act
As was previously noted, the Judicial Review Act provides an occasion
for fact-finding in the district court relating to appeals from the FCC and
certain other agencies.2 9 The FCC has met this problem on two recent occa-
sions;30 the second time resulted in the district court's making extensive find-
ings of fact. This second case, Lake Carriers' Ass/n v. United States,31 poses
the problem squarely and a review of it will clearly present the issue.
In 1968 the FCC issued a Report and Order 2 which changed frequency
deviations on the Great Lakes to provide for better radio communications for
noncommercial pleasure craft. Among other objections, Lake Carriers
complained that this change jeopardized the safety of navigation on the
Lakes. Upon Lake Carriers' petition to the Sixth Circuit for an interlocutory
injunction, that court noted that the Commission had held no hearing on the
safety question. Therefore, the court believed that it had no evidence upon
which to make a determination on Lake Carriers' averments. The court,
then, pursuant to Section 2347(b) of the Judicial Review Act, transferred the
case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for
'the purpose of hearing evidence and making findings of fact concerning public
safety. The evidence to be taken and determinations to be made on remand
were of a highly technical nature concerning a subject to which, given the
27. Id. at 422.
28. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). See Superior
Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969).
30. The first confrontation was in Radio Relay Corp. v. FCC, 409 F.2d 322, 330-31
(2d Cir. 1969). The court avoided the issue by finding that Radio Relay had failed
to establish a genuine issue of material fact and thereby denied them any further
hearing either by a district court or the FCC.
31. 414 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1969).
32. See 47 C.F.R. § 83.137 (1969).
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opportunity, the FCC might have applied its expertise, judgment and discre-
tion to render a binding decision.3 3 Section 2347(b) provided no such op-
portunity.
Legislative History of Section 2347(b)
In 1913 Congress passed the Urgent Deficiencies Act3 4 providing for review
of determinations of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) by a
three-judge district court, with appeal to the Supreme Court upon request. 5
When the FCC was established in 1934, it was Congress' wish that where a
licensee desired to appeal from orders or rules of the Commission affecting
his interest, but which he did not originate, he should file his appeal in a
three-judge district court. Therefore, the original review section of the Com-
munications Act specifically provided that review of rules was to be governed
by the Urgent Deficiencies Act.30  When it was thought desirable to alter the
review procedure for the ICC,3 7 the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit
Judges in 1942 formed the Committee on Review of Orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and Certain Other Administrative Orders (Commit-
tee), and the FCC was asked to participate3 8 since it was affected by the pro-
vision controlling review of ICC orders. "[T]he committee concluded that
review should be had on the record before the administrative agency, [but] it
developed from the evidence that occasionally orders are made . . . without
a hearing, and . . . [therefore] there would be no record . . . . 9 It was
decided to limit the proposed bill to determinations made after a hearing
and let the remaining ones remain reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies
Act.40  The FCC, however, desired all their actions to be subject to one
review provision. Since the bulk of their orders went to the courts of appeals
anyway, 41 the FCC suggested that orders made without a hearing be included
33. See discussion supra notes 4 and 5.
34. 38 Stat. 208.
35. Id. at 219-20.
36. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1093 reads:
The provisions of the Act of October 22, 1913 (38 Stat. 219), relating to the
enforcing or setting aside of the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, are hereby made applicable to suits to enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul, or
suspend any order of the Commission under this Act . . .and such suits are
hereby authorized to be brought as provided in that Act.
37. See Hearings on H.R. 1468, H.R. 1470, H.R. 2271 Before Subcomm. No. 3 and
Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947)
and on H.R. 2915 and H.R. 2916 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 83-86 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
38. Hearings 72-73.
39. Id. 28. An example of such a case would be an emergency service order.
40. Id.
41. Section 402(b) of the Communications Act provided for the review by a court
of appeals of Commission orders except proceedings under Section 402(a).
[Vol. XIX:215
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in the bill. 42 The Committee acquiesced and decided to make two bills, one
providing for circuit court review of orders made after a hearing before the
ICC and leaving other ICC orders reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies
Act; another providing a procedure whereby FCC orders were reviewable
only in the circuit courts. The Committee still had to face the problem of
providing a record for review of FCC orders made without a hearing and,
to cover such occasions, Section 2347(b) was enacted.43  It reads in perti-
nent part today as it did then, with minor changes:
(b) When the agency has not held a hearing before taking the
action of which review is sought by the petition, the court of ap-
peals shall determine whether a hearing is required by law. After
that determination, the court shall-
(1) remand the proceedings to the agency to hold a hearing,
when a hearing is required by law;
(2) pass on the issues presented, when a hearing is not re-
quired by law and it appears from the pleadings and affidavits
filed by the parties that no genuine issue of material fact is
presented; or
(3) transfer the proceedings to a district court . . . for a hear-
ing and determination as if the proceedings were originally
initiated in the district court, when a hearing is not required by
law and a genuine issue of material fact is presented.44
The question arises whether the Committee intended that rule makings be
dealt with as "orders" of the Commission. The Committee had the benefit
of the previously quoted definitions of the APA.
Nowhere in the legislative history does the Committee use the words rule
or rule making, but there is evidence that they intended to include it. In
discussing the problem of orders made without a hearing, it found that
"[c]ertain orders in emergency matters are made without any hearing.
Other orders, legislative or purely administrative in character, are made upon
informal hearings in no sense adversary in character. '' 45 (Emphasis added).
Before the Committee drew and finalized their bills the kinship of rule
making to the legislative function had been clearly established. Rule making
had been referred to as administrative legislation by at least one eminent
professor48 and the Supreme Court had discussed administrative schemes in
terms of legislating by delegation. 47 It would be unrealistic to assume that
rule making was not meant to be covered by the statute.
42. Hearings 28, 71-72.
43. See Hearings 72.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
45. Hearings 87.
46. Fuchs, supra note 10, at 259.
47. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
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The Case Against Judicial Fact-Finding
When adjudicative facts are in question on appeal a hearing is required and
the Judicial Review Act requires the court of appeals to remand to the
agency.48  If the fact issue which arises on appeal is legislative, there is no
such requirement, but there are pertinent reasons why a remand to the agency
rather than a district court is the better procedure. Making findings and
determining questions of fact pertaining to agency policy and discretion
(especially in a case in which the agency has already acted) is best handled
through the filing of briefs and opinions and possibly oral argument, not the
trial-type proceeding to which the courtroom is accustomed. The need is for
participation by private parties in the governmental decision making proc-
ess 49 in the search for a fair and just course of action. Administrative agen-
cies are already familiar with the problems, whereas the district court would
need considerably more time to acquaint itself with often complicated techni-
cal details. The parties are also familiar with the channels of communication
and procedures to follow, since such are standard parts of rule making activity.
One well known scholar, in speaking about orders in the adjudicatory sense
stated that
where a case has arisen before an agency . . . the agency should
complete the job to the greatest extent possible. It should not
shift to the courts the responsibility for the determination of is-
sues characteristically involved in its original determination. It
is the agency which better than any other organ of government
knows what or how much is needed to make a policy work .... 50
This view is even more appropriate in a rule making context where agency
discretion and policy are brought to bear on a legislative activity delegated to
the agency by Congress. In order to preserve the integrity of an administra-
tive agency's legislative processes all facts relevant to a proposed rule should
be ascertained by the agency. One of the principal reasons for the existence
of regulatory agencies is to enable an administrative body to develop ex-
pertise which may then be applied in its special field in order to arrive at
rules and regulations for the governance of a specific activity.51 Congress'
decision to involve a district court in evaluating evidence concerning a subject
which Congress has otherwise delegated to an agency is inconsistent with
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969).
49. 1 DAVIS § 7.07, at 433.
50. Jaffe, The Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Orders, 76 HARV. L. REV.
865, 899 (1963).
51. Speaking of the Federal Radio Commission, predecessor of the FCC, the Su-
preme Court said, "Congress established the Commission as its instrumentality to pro-
vide continuous and expert supervision and to exercise the Administrative judgment
essential in applying legislative standards to a host of instances." Federal Radio
Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 276 (1933) (emphasis added).
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the exercise of such expertise.
The very nature of the legislative function, whether exercised directly by
Congress or by administrative agencies, demands that the rule maker be the
fact-finder. The validity of this statement is illustrated by the language of
the Supreme Court in responding to a challenge of certain FCC rules:
If this contention means that the Regulations are unwise, that they
are not likely to succeed in accomplishing what the Commission
intended, we can say only that the appellants have selected the
wrong forum for such a plea. . . . "We certainly have neither
technical competence nor legal authority to pronounce upon the
wisdom of the course taken by the Commission." [Citation omit-
ted.] Our duty is at an end when we find that the action of the
Commission was based upon findings supported by evidence, and
was made pursuant to authority granted by Congress.52
Thus the rule making agency is ordinarily permitted the legislative privilege
of weighing the evidence as it finds necessary.5 3 Furthermore, in the nature
of the legislature, an agency may act wisely or unwisely on the basis of the
facts as it sees them. 54 The courts do not second guess Congress' conclusions.
Administrative bodies are usually accorded the same freedom to predicate
rule making on the agency's view of the facts. 55
The FCC is authorized to make rules and regulations "from time to time,
as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires."56 In the usual course
of events it would not be for the courts to say that the public interest will be
furthered or retarded by a particular course of action; Congress has delegated
such power to the Commission.57 In numerous regulatory agencies com-
parable to the FCC there is no involvement of the district court in fact-find-
ing.58 In such instances wherein Congress has provided for review of agency
decisions without setting forth standards to be used or the procedure to be
52. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943).
53. Tollefson, Administrative Finality, 29 MIcH. L. REV. 839 (1931).
54. Id. at 840-41. See also Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960);
Brown v. United States, 396 F.2d 989 (Ct. CI. 1968); Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp.
764 (M.D. Fla. 1969); Howard v. Allen, 287 F. Supp. 894 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
55. Colman v. United States, 292 F.2d 283, 286 (Ct. Cl. 1961). See generally 4
DAVIS § 29.01.
56. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1964).
57. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943).
58. The FCC is a regulatory agency in the same sense as the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Federal Power Commission (FPC), and Civil Aero-
nautics Board (CAB). The review provisions of these agencies are found in:
a) SEC--Securities Act of 1933, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 77(i) (1964);
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, § 213, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-13 (1964); Investment
Company Act of 1940, § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-42 (1964); Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1934, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 79x (1964); Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, § 25, 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1964); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 322,
15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (1964).
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followed (unlike the case of the FCC), the Supreme Court has held that
consideration by the reviewing court is to be confined to the administrative
record and that no de novo proceeding may be conducted.59
The Judicial Review Act of 1950 instructs that review is to be had on "the
record of the pleadings, evidence adduced, and proceedings before the agency,
when the agency has held a hearing, whether or not required to do so by
law."'60 The legislative history suggests that Congress provided for re-
mand to the district court in the absence of a hearing out of fear that
there would be nothing for the reviewing court to look at in judging the
Commission action. However, the APA requires the Commission to take
action through rules and regulations only after careful consideration of the
factors bearing on the problem. Section 4 of the APA requires publication
of a notice of proposed rule making6' and thereafter the agency is required to
afford interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity to present the same orally in any manner, and after consideration
of all relevant matter presented, incorporate in any rules adopted a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose. 62  Oral argument, while not
required, is one of the major procedural methods in administrative rule mak-
ing.63 Perhaps in emergency situations such as referred to by the Committee,
the Commission may have no written record of the basis for its decision,
and some procedure is required to provide evidence for the court to review;6 4
but this is not the case in a rule making of any consequence. The APA
recognized that policy and discretionary matters involved in rule makings
do not require a formal hearing and thus did not provide for one. However,
b) CAB-49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1964).
c) FPC-Federal Power Act, § 313, 16 U.S.C. § 825(l) (1964).
Nowhere in these provisions is there the dichotomy of review present in the FCC
statute. All orders are treated in the same manner, that manner being the procedure
followed in Section 401(b) of the Communications Act.
59. United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963). "De novo" in
this context means any proceeding involving calling witnesses and taking evidence, as
would be necessary for the district court to do if it were to have a hearing and make a
determination as required by the statute.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2347(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1964).
62. Id. This section, as well as Section 1003(a), does not apply to interpre-
tive rules, general statements of policy, rules of agency organizations, procedure, or
practice, or in any situation in which the agency for good reason finds (and in-
corporates the finding and a brief statement of the reasons therefore in rules issued)
that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest.
63. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
105 (1941).
64. Even then there is no reason why problems should not be remanded to the
agency.
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there is no reason why an informal proceeding such as that provided for in
a rule making would not build an adequate record and satisfy the need for a
record on which to base an appellate decision.
In rare instances (i.e., the Lake Carriers' situation) when the absence of a
specific factual determination in the agency record precludes the court of
appeals from deciding the case, there is no reason why a remand to the FCC
could not be an effective vehicle for resolving the fact question. Such a
procedure would remove the possibility that a court could make a single fact
determination binding on an agency even though such determination were
made in a vacuum devoid of agency legislative expertise. The agency would
also be given an opportunity to rectify its omission of the fact and to conform
its processes in the case to the guidelines in Section 4 of the APA.
Putting aside the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts,
there is a general standard of review as to any type question of fact as op-
posed to review of questions of law. In the context of judicial review of
administrative action the term question of fact means an administrative
question on which a court should not substitute its judgment, and question of
law is a question on which the court may properly substitute judgment. 65
Questions of law are to be decided judicially, for the judge, both by
training and tradition, is best equipped to deal with them. "Our
desire to have courts determine questions of law is related to a
belief in their possession of expertness with regard to such ques-
tions." [Citation omitted.] These considerations do not apply
with equal force to the judicial review of the factual issues arising
out of administrative determinations. There, the advantages of
expertise are with the administrator.66
The APA recognizes this when it gives the reviewing court authority to decide
all relevant questions of law but allows it to set aside or hold unlawful find-
ings and conclusions of the agency only for limited reasons.6 7 Thus the
procedure called for in Section 2347(b) (3) of the Judicial Review Act is a
departure from the accepted principles governing review of administrative
decisions.
Conclusion
Applying the foregoing discussion to the Lake Carriers case, it is clear that
a better procedure would have enabled the court of appeals to remand the
case to the Commission for any further proceedings. Whether "the public
safety was seriously affected by the FCC rule making on frequency devia-
65. 4 DAvis § 30.02, at 193.
66. Schwartz, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact and the Administrative Procedure
Act, 19 FORDHAM L. REv. 73 (1950).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1964).
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tions" is clearly a question calling for application of Commission expertise.
The additional evidence taken was of a highly technical nature reaching into
great detail. Moreover, there had been an extensive proceeding in the
Commission before the rule was made effective. The absence of a particular
finding material to a question under review should be no reason to deprive
the Commission of the opportunity to make the initial determination of fact
on remand, since the agency has already been well immersed in related as-
pects of the same problem.
The Judicial Review Act should be amended to provide for remand to the
agency for fact-finding where the record does not reveal a finding of mate-
rial fact necessary to the reviewing court's decision. In such manner the
FCC review procedure would be reconciled with the practice of other agencies
and with the principles of the administrative process.
Jeffrey W. Malickson
